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 ABSTRACT 
  
A new mechanism that substantially mitigates social dilemmas is examined theoretically 
and experimentally. It resembles the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) except that 
in each decision round subjects are ranked and then grouped according to their public 
contribution. The game has multiple mostly asymmetric, Pareto-ranked pure-strategy 
equilibria which are rather counterintuitive, yet experimental subjects tacitly coordinate the 
payoff-dominant equilibrium reliably and quite precisely. In the VCM grouping is random 
which, with its arbitrary relation to contribution corresponds to any grouping unrelated to 
output, for example grouping based on race or gender. The new mechanism resembles a 
meritocracy since based on how much they contribute; participants are assigned to strata 
that vary in payoff. The findings shed light on the nature of merit-based social and 
organizational grouping and provide guidelines for future research and application.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Sorting and grouping of similar types are ubiquitous in human communities. As 
pointed out by Schelling (1971), an important factor that determines the exact nature of 
social segregation is the grouping and stratification criteria that social units such as 
organizations and societies actually apply. Throughout history, stratification has most often 
been based on arbitrary criteria such as gender, race, class, heritage, nepotism or cronyism, 
which are unfair and quite inefficient since they usually fail to place the best suited agent 
into a given position, and are unrelated to a person’s output.   
Modern organizations and contemporary societies increasingly reject such arbitrary 
criteria and are becoming meritocracies, where grouping and stratification is competitively 
based on individual contributions. This development has been helped along in the past 
century or so by equal-rights movements, scholarship programs, and increasingly global, 
and hence more intense, competition in education and business. Talent searches for 
outstanding workers or graduate students are becoming more geographically balanced, and 
performance reviews in organizations more extensive and systematic. Labor markets, the 
hiring and promotion systems of organizations, education systems1, and even immigration 
policies2 increasingly take on the features of a meritocracy. With the resulting increase in 
competitiveness of these social units, units that still apply sorting and segregation systems 
that are unrelated to output and make them less productive and competitive3 can be 
expected to weaken, and either change or disappear. 4  
                                                 
 1 For example, in order to increase their intellectual competitiveness the impact of legacy preferences in Ivy 
League schools was decreased; other non-performance related intake criteria common in the early 20th 
century in order to control the ethnic and gender composition of the student body were abolished (Karabel, 
2005).  
2 For example, Australia offers preferential entry for skilled immigrants. 
3 An early example is 13th century Mongol general Genghis Khan, who conquered large regions of Asia. He 
accepted all warriors of proven ability into his army, regardless of their origin. 
4 For example Singapore, among the most successful Asian countries by most standards, seceded from 
Malaysia in 1965 because it rejected ethnic quotas in the assignment of social and professional roles in favor 
of meritocratic principles.  
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Our results show that in addition to placing the most able person into a given 
position, and being often perceived as fairer than other stratification systems, meritocracies 
have yet another advantage over arbitrary stratification: arbitrary stratification generates an 
incentive for everyone to free-ride since an individual’s contribution has in the extreme 
case, no impact at all on his strata membership. Examples would be caste systems, or the 
pre-revolutionary social structure of France.  A meritocracy on the other hand, as our 
theoretical analysis (Section II) and experiments (Sections IV and V) show, can be an 
effective mechanism to substantially reduce free-riding in an organization or society.  The 
theoretical analysis also sheds some light on existing experimental results (reviewed in 
Section III) about the effectiveness of competitive sorting as a means of attenuating social 
dilemmas.  
 
II. THEORY 
We model a meritocracy as a variation of the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism 
(VCM) (Isaac, McCue & Plott, 1985), which has become a standard model to explore free-
riding.  Participants are randomly assigned to groups of fixed size n. Group members then 
each decide simultaneously and anonymously how much of their funds to keep for 
themselves, and how much to contribute to their group account. Inputs into the group 
account are multiplied by a factor g >15 representing the benefits from cooperation, before 
being equally divided among all group members. As long as g < n  the game is a social 
dilemma since efficiency is maximized if all participants contribute fully, but each 
individual’s dominant strategy is to keep his endowment for herself while receiving her 
share of the group account. The VCM’s widely replicated result is that the equilibrium of 
                                                 
5 We assume without loss of generality that the multiplication factor for the private account is simply 1.  
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noncontribution by all is all but reached after about ten repetitions (See, e.g., Ledyard, 
1995; Davis and Holt, 1993).  
The key difference between the VCM and the Meritocracy Mechanism introduced 
here (henceforth, MM) is that in a standard VCM participants are randomly assigned to 
groups. In its effects on incentives this is comparable to grouping by criteria unrelated to 
individuals’ contribution, such as race or gender. In the MM in contrast, group membership 
is systematically based on individuals’ contributions to the group account. At each round, 
aall MM participants get ranked according to their contribution decision. Only thereafter 
and based on this ranking, are participants partitioned into equal-sized groups. For the 
equilibrium analysis of the MM game it is important to note that any ties for group 
membership are broken at random. In the decision round’s final step, individual earnings 
are computed taking into account to which group a subject has been assigned.   All this is 
common knowledge.  
Since the MM is not just about a single group but about a mini-society consisting of 
several units, it differs from the VCM in how members of a cooperative group are modeled 
within their larger society: In the standard VCM each arbitrarily composed group is 
modeled in isolation. In the MM all socially mobile members of a community are linked 
via a cooperative -competitive mechanism in which they, with their contribution decisions, 
compete for membership in strata with potentially different collective output and payoffs. 
The MM’s equilibrium analysis (See Section II.A for the formal analysis) must therefore 
cover multiple groups. This increases the model’s realism. Under naturally occurring 
circumstances too, cooperative groups do not exist in isolation but are in the end part of a 
larger social fabric.6  
                                                 
6 The assumption of fixed group size (just as in the VCM) might at first appear quite stylized for a model 
designed to represent social stratification. However, social stratification often implies fixed group (stratum) 
size. Examples are journal space in tier 1 journals or labor markets in which there are usually a fixed number 
of jobs available, such as the annual supply of junior positions at Research 1 universities. In such cases, if 
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In contrast to the VCM with its dominant strategy equilibrium of non-contribution 
by all, the MM has multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria. Non-contribution by all is one of 
them, but with the introduction of competitive sorting it becomes merely the least efficient 
among several best-response equilibria. All other pure strategy equilibria are asymmetric: a 
significant number of players make a positive contribution while the remainder contributes 
nothing.7 As shown in Table 1 (columns 1-3) the exact number of these “relatively 
efficient” asymmetric equilibria, their number of contributors b and their positive 
contribution si* depend on g/n, which is the marginal per capital return from the group 
account (henceforth, MPCR). The Table lists the relatively efficient equilibria for two sets 
of parameters commonly used in VCM experiments, which allows a good comparison with 
pre-existing data.  For each set of parameters, the most efficient equilibrium (shaded cells) 
is close to Pareto optimal, and as Section II.A below shows formally, there is usually one 
such equilibrium for any MPCR condition.8 Note that in all equilibria listed in Table 1 the 
number of players who contribute, b is not divisible by the group size n.  The fact that not 
all contributors can therefore be in a homogeneous group is crucial to the structure of the 
relatively efficient equilibria. Since ties among contributors with regard to group 
membership are solved at random, the equilibrium-payoffs to cooperators, (and, in cases 
where b>n, to free-riders as well) are expected, rather than secure, payoffs. It can be 
verified from the Table (columns 4-7) that in every relatively efficient equilibrium A) the 
expected payoffs from contributing and from not contributing are such that no player has 
an incentive to unilaterally deviate, and B) every player is better off than in a situation in 
                                                                                                                                                    
there are more “perfect” candidates than positions, a perfect candidate will reach the top stratum only with 
probability <1. 
7 In addition there exist mixed-strategy equilibria. The question of the applicability of mixed strategy 
equilibria in predicting behavior has so far produced unclear and  context dependent results. (See, e.g., 
Walker & Wooders (2001), Estes (1964) for evidence that humans cannot randomize, Rapoport & Budescu 
(1997) for evidence of restricted randomization,  but Rapoport & Boebel (1992)  and O’Neill (1987) or some 
indications to the opposite. Most importantly for the case of the MM however, the behavioral data (Section 
V) do not support mixed strategies, and thus echo the results from Market Entry games, which are somewhat 
similar to the MM in structure, and are reviewed in Section III.  
8 See the Theorem in Section II. 
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which no one contributes. The next section formally derives all pure strategy equilibria in 
the MM.  
 
II.A. Formal equilibrium analysis
As in the VCM, the meritocracy environment includes i = 1, …, N players, each 
with a positive endowment wi. As in the VCM, each participant i makes an integer 
contribution si to the group account and leaves the remainder wi - si in his private account. 
All i are then ranked according to their  contribution decisions with ties broken at random, 
and divided into G < N (G > 2) groups of equal size n. Subjects with the highest n 
contributions are put into group 1, subjects with the second highest n contributions are put 
into group 2 and so on. Let Gi be the group in which subject i is placed, and iGσ  be the 
sum of the contributions of all n-1 subjects in subject i’s group except subject i. The pay-
off function for subject i is the basic VCM payoff function: 
 
)()(),( iGiiGii smsws ii ++−= σσπ        (1) 
 
The parameter m () is the marginal per-capital return (MPCR) from an investment into the 
group account. If m > 
n
1 , it is Pareto optimal for each subject to make the highest possible 
contribution to the group account, in which case all groups of subjects will have the same 
total contribution and the same return.  In the standard VCM environment with random 
group assignment, as long as m < 1 and for any configuration of contributions by the other 
participants, each player i maximizes her individual payoff by contributing nothing to the 
group account.  Hence, the dominant strategy is si = 0 for all i = 1, …, N. This is also the 
least efficient allocation of resources from among all possible allocations. We next show 
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that the MM’s competitive group assignment based on individual contribution decisions 
increases the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria. 
For notational simplicity, we drop the index G from iGσ , and denote by iσ  the sum 
of group account contributions of all other subjects in the same group as i except subject i. 
We proceed to find all pure strategy Nash equilibria of the MM by elimination, using the 
following three Lemmata: 
Lemma 1: Any set of pure strategies S in which there is at least one player i with strategy si 
> 0 who is in group Gi with probability 1 and will stay with probability 1 in the same group 
by playing si - 1 cannot be a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. 
Proof: Using (1), the expected payoff of strategy si if player i is in group Gi for certain is 
iiiii smmws )1()( −++= σπ . The expected payoff for player i of strategy si-1 if she stays 
in the same group for certain is )(1)1()1( iiiiiii smsmmws πσπ >−+−++=−  because m 
< 1 Player i has an incentive to play s⇒ i-1; so si cannot be a part of a pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium.  
Observation 1: Lemma 1 also applies in cases when player i could be classified as a 
member of any of several groups as long as the level of contribution of the other players in 
these groups is the same within their group.  
Lemma 2: Any set of pure strategies S in which there is at least one player i with strategy si 
> 0 who is in group Gi with probability 1 and will stay with some probability p > 0 in the 
same group by playing si - 1 cannot be a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. 
Proof: Using (1), the expected payoff of strategy si if player i is in group Gi for certain is 
iiiii smmws )1()( −++= σπ . The expected payoff of player i when playing si-1 is 
1)1()1(1)1( −−++−++−=− iiiiiii mppmsmsws σσπ .  A Nash Equilibrium requires that 
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)( ii sπ )1( −≥ ii sπ . This is equivalent to 
≥−++ iii smmw )1(σ 1)1()1(1 −−++−++− iiiii mppmsmsw σσ or 
 
≤−m1 )()1( 1−−− iimp σσ         (2) 
 
If we have assumed that player i stays with some probability in the same group by playing 
si-1, then there are other players with that same strategy in the group directly below. Let us 
pick one of these players and call her player j.  We know that sj = si – 1.  The current 
expected payoff of player j is 1)1()1(1)( −−++−++−= iiiijji mrrmsmsws σσπ  where r 
is the probability that player j will be assigned to the higher group together with i. If player 
j raises her contribution by 1, then she will be in the same group as i for certain. Player j’s 
pay-off in this case is iiijji mmssws σπ ++−=+ )1( . A Nash Equilibrium requires that 
≥)( ji sπ )1( +ji sπ . This is equivalent to 
1)1()1(1 −−++−++− iiiij mrrmsmsw σσ iii smmw )1( −++≥ σ  or 
 
))(1(1 1−−−≥− iirmm σσ         (3) 
 
Combining requirements (2) and (3), it is obvious that under a pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium it must be the case that r ≥  p (Assuming 01 >− −jj σσ ).  
At the same time we know that p equals the number of slots available for strategy si-1 in 
the higher group if player i decreases his contribution divided by the number of players that 
would be contributing si-1. We express this as 
1
1
1
1
+
+=
−
−
i
i
s
s
h
x
xp  . At the same time r is equal 
to the number of slots available for strategy si -1 in the higher group divided by the number 
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of players that are currently contributing si-1.   We define this as 
1
1
−
−=
i
i
s
h
s
x
x
r  . Since one can 
obtain the fraction p from the fraction r by adding 1 to the numerator and the denominator, 
it can be verified that p >r. This, however, is in direct contradiction to the combined (2) 
and (3) above, which require that r ≥  p. This means that a Nash Equilibrium in pure 
strategies does not exists under the conditions of Lemma 2 because either i or j will always 
have an incentive to deviate.   
Lemma 3: Any strategy set S in which every player i plays a strategy si > 0 and is 
classified into group j with probability pi > 0 and into group j-1 with probability 1-pi 
cannot be a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium (Assuming 01 >− −jj σσ ). 
Proof: The condition in Lemma 3 implies that for all players there can be only two 
different strategies si and sk  (si > sk) and the number of players using strategy si (or sk) 
cannot be divisible by n.  The condition also implies that the maximum possible pi or 
2
1<=
N
npk . 
Player k’s expected payoff is 1)1()( −−+++−= jkjkkkkk mpmpmsswskπ σ σ . If player k 
increases her contribution by 1, she will be classified into the higher group for sure so 
jkkkkk mmmssws σπ +++−−=+ 1)1( . The Nash equilibrium requires that 
≥)( kk sπ )1( +kk sπ . This is equivalent to 
≥−+++− −1)1( jkjkkkk mpmpmssw σσ jkkk mmmssw σ+++−− 1  or 
 
))(1(1 1−−−≥− iikpmm σσ         (4) 
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If player k decreases her contribution to 0, she will be classified into the lower group for 
sure; So 1)0( −+= jkk mw σπ . The Nash equilibrium requires that ≥)( kk sπ )0(kπ . This is 
equivalent to ≥−+++− −1)1( jkjkkkk mpmpmssw σσ 1−+ jk mw σ  or 
 
)(11 1−−≤− iii
k
mp
s
m σσ         (5) 
 
Combining (4) and (5) and the restriction that  pk is less than ½ results in , which is 
not permitted since we are investigating discrete strategies >0.  
1<ks
Observation 2: Lemmata 1, 2, and 3 do not apply if si = 0 for all i. However, it is easy to 
show that such a configuration is a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies since no player has 
an incentive to deviate. 
Observation 3: The only points of the strategy space not yet eliminated by Lemmata 1, 2 
and 3 are the ones in which b > n players use some strategy si > 0, while the remaining N-b 
players use strategy 0 and q = b mod n > 0. 
Equilibrium requirements  
Keeping in mind Observations 2 and 3 we can characterize all pure strategy equilibrium 
requirements. The expected payoff of player i is 
iiiiii sqb
qmsl
b
qbmmssws )1()1()( −+−−++−=π . If player i increases his contribution 
by one his pay-off will be iiiii snmmsmsws )1(1)1( −+++−−=+π . If player i decides 
to lower his contribution to 1 then his pay-off is ii sqmmw )1(1)1( −++−=π ; finally, if 
player i decides to go to zero, there are two cases to consider: When b < N-n , his payoff is 
ii sqbN
qlmw )1(
1
)0( −+−
−+=π  and when b > N-n, his pay-off is ii sqmw )1()0( −+=π . 
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Hence, we can now generalize the three conditions, (6), (7), and (8), that characterize the 
pure strategy Nash equilibrium from Player i’s viewpoint. They are the following:   
isqnb
q
m
)(1
1
−+
≤ if si < w  where w  is the upper bound of the strategy set (6) 
)(1
1
qn
b
qbss
sm
ii
i
−−+−
−≥ , and       (7) 
)1(
1
)1(1
1
−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+−
−−+−−+
≤
q
bN
qn
b
qn
b
qb
m  if b < N-n or  
)(1
1
qn
b
qb
m
−−+
≥ if b > N-n        (8) 
The expected payoff of a player who contributes 0 is ii qsbN
qnmw −
−+=)0(π  if b < N-n  
and ii mqsw +=)0(π  if b > N-n. If this player raises his contribution by 1, his payoff is 
ii mqsmw ++−= 1)1(π . If the player matches the contributions of the other players, his 
payoff is iiiiii sqb
qmsn
b
qbmmssws )1(
1
1)1(
1
)( −+
++−+
−++−=π . The player could also 
increase his contribution by one above everybody else’s if si < w , so that he is in the 
highest group with probability one, resulting in a payoff of 
iiiii snmmsmsws )1(1)1( −+++−−=+π . The conditions characterizing the pure 
strategy Nash equilibrium from this player’s view point are described in (9) and (10) 
 
If b < N-n then 
 
iqsbN
qnbN
m
−
+−−+
≤
1
1 , 
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q
bN
qnq
b
qn
b
qb
m
−
−−−+
++−+
−+
≤
)1(
1
1)1(
1
1
1 , and  
 
ii
i
qs
bN
qnsn
sm
−
−−−+
+≤
)1(1
1
if si < w       (9) 
 
If b > N-n then 
 
qq
b
qn
b
qb
m
−−+
++−+
−+
≤
)1(
1
1)1(
1
1
1 , and 
 
ii
i
qssn
sm −−+
+≤
)1(1
1
 if si < w        (10) 
 
Existence of equilibria with positive contributions    
Inequalities (6) – (10) help identify the pure strategy Nash equilibria for a specific 
set of N, n, wi within a specific MPCR m.9 We examine MPCRs of 0.3 and 0.5, where N = 
12, n = 4, and wi = 100 for all i. Table 1 lists, for these particular cases, the equilibria  that 
involve some positive contributions si*. 9 Since the equilibria are asymmetric and each of 
the symmetric participants contributes either si* or sk*, there exist  equilibria for each 
row of Table 1.  
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
b
N
 
The following theorem shows the conditions that guarantee the existence of equilibria 
characterized by only a few players contributing nothing in the lowest group and everyone 
else contributing the highest possible amount w . 
                                                 
9 The equilibrium in which all contribute nothing (Observation 2) is omitted from the Table. 
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Theorem: If m > 
n
1  (11), that is, is it Pareto optimal for everyone to contribute everything 
to the group account, and G > 1 (12), then there exists at least one pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium in which b* > (N– n) players contribute w  and the remaining N – b* players 
contribute nothing.  
Proof: It is easy to see that from the viewpoint of every player contributing w , 
)0()( ww y ππ <  for any y < w  because strategy y will keep this player in the lowest group 
together with all the 0-contributors. An equilibrium as described in the above theorem 
exists only if there is some b for which )0()( ww w ππ ≥ . We denote by h(b) the difference 
between the current expected payoff of a player contributing w  and her expected payoff if 
she unilaterally switches to 0.  We have h(b) = =− )0()( ww w ππ  
wmw +− wbN
b
nNm )( −−+ . The derivative 0)()( 2 <−−=∂
∂
b
nNNw
b
bh , hence h(b) is 
always decreasing, and reaches 0 at 
mnNm
nNmNbw −+−
−=
1)(
)(*  (13). It follows that for every b 
< *wb , )0()( ww w ππ > . 
Let us next look at the equilibrium configuration from the point of view of the players 
contributing zero. These players also face )0()( 00 ππ <y  for any y < w  because strategy y 
will keep such a player in the lowest group together with all the other 0-contributors. An 
equilibrium as described in the theorem exists only if there is some b for which 
)0()( 00 ππ ≤w . Let us denote by f(b) the difference between the current expected payoff of 
the players contributing 0 and the player’s expected payoff if such a player unilaterally 
switches to w .  In this case we have  
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f(b)= =− )()0( 00 wππ ))((1 bNnNb
wmw −−+− . We see that 
=∂
∂
b
bf )( 0
)1(
)1)((
2 >+
+−
b
NnNwm , so f(b) is always increasing, and reaches 0 at 
1)(
1)(*
0 +−
−−=
nNm
nNmNb  (14). We conclude that for every b > , *0b )()0( 00 wππ > . Comparing 
*
wb  and , it can be seen that  < 
*
0b
*
0b
*
wb  since 
*
wb  has a larger numerator and a smaller 
denominator. Hence, there is always some b between  and *0b
*
wb  for which )0()( ww w ππ >  
and )()0( 00 wππ >  because of the properties of the h(.) and f(.) functions discussed 
above.10  It follows that there is always some b for which no player has an incentive to 
deviate from his strategy. To complete the proof it is sufficient to show that, under the 
conditions of the theorem: 
(a) There is an integer b between  and *0b
*
wb  or  + 1 < 
*
0b
*
wb . 
(b)  nNb −>*0
Using (13) and (14) we can show that (a) is equivalent to 
1
1
+> nm . The latter is true 
because of (11).  Using (14) we see that (b) is equivalent to  
nN
n
n
m −
−> 11            (15) 
It is easy to verify that (15) is also true because of (11) and as long as 
2
1+≤ Nn , which is 
equivalent to (12) .  
This completes the proof.  
Note that the criteria for the existence of the equilibrium described in the Theorem 
are not very strict. As long as it is Pareto optimal for everyone to contribute everything to 
                                                 
10 Since these are strict inequalities, there only exists some b between  and *0b
*
wb  for which the equilibrium 
is strict.  
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the public account and the population is divided in at least two groups, the MM has a pure 
strategy Nash equilibrium in which a large proportion of all individuals contribute the 
highest possible amount to the public account. This might be one of the reasons for the 
relatively frequent usage of this mechanism in practice. Another reason is the broad nature 
of the MM’s team output.  
  
II.B. The excludability of the group good in the MM 
Extending the concept of excludability  
By adding competitive sorting based on contributions to an otherwise standard 
VCM we also explore a more general conjecture about the effects of excludability on the 
ease of providing public goods. It is generally accepted that excludable group goods are 
more easily provided than nonexcludable ones, and that goods can be placed on a spectrum 
according to their excludability (Buchanan, 1965).  However, there is an additional and 
often overlooked point to consider: what exactly are the criteria for exclusion? Are they 
under individual control, such as effort or are they entirely arbitrary?  
We suggest expanding Buchanan’s spectrum with a second axis representing to 
what extent the exclusion criteria are under individual control. The latter obviously is most 
important for efficiency since it determines to what extent individuals can be incentivized 
to work for the public good. Obviously, random assignment in the VCM is meant to model 
non-excludability - all participants have an equal chance of being in any group. However, 
with regard to its arbitrariness, disconnectedness from output, and lack of individual 
control, a lottery for group membership in an experiment is equivalent to the genetic lottery 
of gender or skin color which determines life-long strata assignment in non-meritocratic 
societies.  
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In Section II.A we found that with increased performance-related rather than 
arbitrary excludability A) quite inefficient equilibria still exist (See Table 1 and 
Observation 2), B) there are still no 100% efficient equilibria, and C) as long as the 
conditions in the Theorem are met, there always exists an equilibrium in which the 
resource allocation is close to Pareto optimal. The experimental results (Section V) show 
that this most efficient equilibrium is reliably selected by experimental subjects.  
The location of the MM team output along Buchanan’s spectrum  
Various mechanisms have been proposed in the past for the provision of public 
goods. See Vickrey (1961), Clarke (1971), Groves (1973), Smith (1977), Walker (1981), 
and Varian (1994) for some of the most notable. Manageable versions of some of these 
mechanisms have been tested in the laboratory, but with mixed results (See, e.g. Scherr & 
Babb, 1975; Smith, 1977; Chen & Tang, 1998; Andreoni & Varian, 1999; Attiyeh, 
Franciosi & Isaac, 2000; Chen & Gazzale, 2005; Oprea, Smith & Winn, 2005) and these 
mechanisms have usually not been used in the field.11 The MM in contrast has evolved in 
the field and, as discussed in Section I, has been implemented in diverse contemporary and 
even historical settings. 
It matters for the practical applicability of the MM model that the team output in 
both the VCM and the MM need not be a pure public good in Samuelson’s (1954) sense. 
Rather, the VCM’s and the MM’s group account covers a range near the public end of 
Buchanan’s (1965) spectrum, not just an endpoint. This is because group size is fixed and 
every group member gets the same share of the group account. Any debate about the extent 
to which the group account is congestible, excludable, or rival is therefore unnecessary.12 
Further, the linear and commonly known monetary payoff functions of the VCM and MM 
                                                 
11 To our knowledge the sole exception is a market-like mechanism used in a public good context, reported in 
Ferejohn and Noll (1976). 
12Were group size variable (non-excludability), experimentally (hence, monetarily) modeling nonrival 
consumption of the joint output poses a challenge since the MPCR varies with group size unless g is also 
concomitantly varied;  the latter however affects the attractiveness of the social optimum. 
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allow bypassing the issue of preference revelation that is central to traditional public goods 
mechanisms. The VCM’s and MM’s focus is thus shifted away from determining the 
optimal allocation and provision level and toward the act of free-riding itself. The group 
account in the VCM or MM can represent any joint output by a team, organization or 
society, ranging from a pure public good to a shared good that is divisible and/or rival, 
such as for example a pooled investment.  
Since it covers a broad range of goods the MM model is applicable in a variety of 
contexts, as a social or organizational structure that increases efficiency or effectiveness.  
 
 II. C. The stability of the relatively efficient equilibria in the MM   
MPCR-dependent risk and strategic uncertainty  
It is well known that in a standard VCM the MPCR affects behavior even though, 
within the limits set by the social dilemma property of the game, it does not affect the 
equilibrium: the lower the MPCR, the faster the convergence toward non-contribution by 
all (See, e.g., Gunnthorsdottir, Houser & McCabe, 2007; Isaac & Walker, 1988; Isaac, 
Walker & Thomas, 1984). There are two possible reasons for this: First, the lower the 
MPCR the less of a difference there is between the efficient payoff when everybody 
contributes and the equilibrium payoff when nobody contributes. Second, the maximum a 
full contributor can lose is (1-m) wi, while non-contribution guarantees a payoff of at least 
wi. There is ample evidence, starting with Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) seminal paper, 
that people are sensitive to the risk of losses in relation to their original wealth level wi . All 
these facts taken together mean that contributing, never an equilibrium strategy in the 
VCM, is even less attractive there the lower the MPCR. These principles hold essentially 
for the MM as well, but with additional twists.  
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Compared to the VCM, the MM involves additional strategic uncertainty. First, 
there is now a choice between equilibria; the MPCR determines their number and structure 
Second, in any equilibrium involving positive contributions a contributor’s final payoff 
depends on the random process that solves the ties for group memberships inherent in all 
such equilibria. The probability of a contributor being in either a heterogeneous or a 
homogeneous group is determined by the MPCR-dependent parameter b (See Table 1, 
columns 1 and 2).  
Another risk-related feature of the equilibria in Table 1 worth noting is that the 
expected payoff from contributing (column 5) is slightly lower than the payoff from free-
riding (column 7), be the latter expected (if b=5) or even guaranteed (if b=9). Further, in all 
equilibria under MPCR= 0.5 the highest payoff a contributor could earn if she is assigned 
to a homogeneous group (right half of Column 4) equals a non-contributor’s certain payoff 
(See columns 6 and 7). Under MPCR=0.3, if b=9, an equilibrium with positive 
contributions is even less favorable to a contributor: Even her highest possible payoff 
(column 4 right) is slightly lower than what a non-contributor has guaranteed (columns 6 
and 7).13
If subjects are sensitive to the fact that the efficient payoff is lower under 
MPCR=0.3 than under MPCR=0.5, or are averse to loss relative to their original 
endowment level wi (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), or are responsive to how the 
(sometimes even certain) free-rider payoff in equilibrium compares to the expected 
cooperator payoff and its upper range, one could expect behavioral differences between 
MPCR=0.3 and MPCR=0.5. In particular, subjects might be more reluctant to contribute 
fully under MPCR=0.3, possibly settling for one of the equilibria with a low si (See Table 
1, column 3).  
                                                 
13 If b=5 then contributors and non-contributors alike face expected, rather than secure, payoffs. Again, non-
contributor expected payoffs slightly exceed contributor expected payoffs. It can easily be verified however 
that movement away from any configuration listed in Table 1 is not stable. 
Meritocracy 
20 
 
Robustness to small deviations by individual players  
While the relatively efficient equilibrium configurations in Table 1 may be 
susceptible to risk attitudes, they are quite robust to deviations by single players. In this 
sense the MM differs significantly from weakest link games or step-level public goods 
games, (discussed in the next section) where a deviation by a single player can prove quite 
disastrous to overall efficiency since it immediately drives everybody else’s incentives 
toward a much less efficient equilibrium.  In all configurations listed in Table 1, if a player 
reduces his contribution even by a small amount, he is placed in the lowest group with 
certainty. The remaining full contributors have an increased chance of being assigned to a 
homogeneous contributor group and have no incentive to change their strategy. The 
configuration is equally stable if a non-contributor deviates.  
 
III. RELATED GAMES AND EXPERIMENTAL FINDINGS 
If refined by the payoff dominance criterion (Harsanyi & Selten, 1988) the MM 
leads to unique predictions about aggregate behavior. The payoff dominance principle 
however is not the sole method of equilibrium selection and not entirely uncontested (See, 
e.g., Binmore, 1989; Aumann, 1988). It is therefore desirable to triangulate with an 
empirical test of equilibrium selection for specific games.  Does the MM’s contribution-
based group assignment indeed induce participants to coordinate the most efficient 
equilibrium, asymmetric and counterintuitive as it is?  We now proceed to briefly review 
the experimental literature on competitive group membership, and the tacit coordination of 
payoff dominant and asymmetric equilibria that would lead one to hypothesize such an 
outcome. 
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Exclusion and Competitive group membership 
Recent empirical studies with the standard VCM as their benchmark show 
impressive efficiency gains if it is common information that group membership is 
competitively based on contributions. Cabrera, Fatas, Lacomba & Neugebauer’s (2006) 
two-group experiment indicates that even very limited contribution-based mobility raises 
average contributions.  14 In an experiment by Cinyabuguma 05, Page and Putterman’s (20 ) 
there was greater mobility; subjects were informed about each others’ historical 
contributions15 and could permanently expel others, via a majority vote. 
groups
Most relevant to 
the MM are the results of Page, Putterman & Unel (2006). Players were again informed 
about each others’ historical contributions and ranked each other on their desirability as 
fellow group members. The ranking determined the composition of fixed-size . As 
in all these studies, there were substantial efficiency gains. Interestingly, endogenous 
decentralized ranking by the participants themselves accurately traced individuals’ 
historical contribution. In real-world meritocratic systems ranking is frequently 
decentralized and endogenous as in Page et al.’s study. We note however that centralized 
ranking, as in the MM, is also common.   16
Tacit Coordination 
The MM requires two forms of tacit coordination: First, participants must 
coordinate one among multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria. Second, since most pure strategy 
equilibria including the most efficient one are asymmetric (Table 1), subjects must 
coordinate the equilibrium strategies in the correct proportions.  Each of these coordination 
                                                 
14Croson, Fatas & Neugebauer (2006) apply a different form of limited exclusion. The lowest contributor is 
excluded from the group output in that round, rather than from the group, which maintains its composition 
over rounds. Hence, there is no contribution-based re-stratification. It is noteworthy that competition within a 
team for access to the group output, rather than competition across a mini-society as in the MM, also raises 
contributions to near-optimal levels. 
15 The inclusion of historical contributions in ranking systems, such as in Cinyabuguma et al. and Page et al. 
is a realistic assumption, as seen in the reliance on vitas, references, and other reputational mechanisms.  
However, it would significantly complicate any attempt an equilibrium analysis.  
16 With regard to promotion or skilled immigration, for example, ranking is by a central agent. On the other 
hand, endogenous stratification exists in labor markets, or in self-selected teams such as among co-authors.  
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challenges has been studied extensively on their own, in particular in market entry games 
(asymmetric equilibria), and weakest link games (multiple Pareto ranked equilibria), games 
substantially differ from the MM. They co-occur in step-level VCMs. We now briefly 
review each in turn. 
Tacit coordination of asymmetric equilibria.  In the most typical version of the market 
entry (ME) game (Selten & Guth, 1982; Gary-Bobo, 1990) each player decides whether or 
not to engage in an activity, such as entering a market.  For not entering, the payoff is a 
low, positive constant; for entering, the payoff is potentially higher but decreases in the 
number of entrants. In the (Pareto deficient) equilibrium payoffs from entering or staying 
out are - somewhat depending on the granularity of the parameters - roughly equal.   
Relatively large groups of experimental subjects coordinate these asymmetric equilibria 
“without learning and communication” (Camerer & Fehr, 2006, p.50). See, e.g., Meyer, 
Van Huyck, Battalio & Saving 1992; Rapoport, 1995; Rapoport, Seale, Erev & Sundali, 
1998; Sundali, Rapoport and Seale, 1995; Erev & Rapoport, 1998. Even though the 
equilibrium organizes aggregate behavior surprisingly well, individual level data are quite 
unsystematic, supporting neither pure nor mixed strategies  (Rapoport, Seale & Winter, 
2002; Seale & Rapoport, 2000; Erev & Rapoport, 1998; Rapoport, 1995; See also Duffy & 
Hopkins, 2005). 
Multiple Pareto ranked equilibria. In a series of “weakest link” (henceforth, WL) 
games much replicated since, Van Huyck and colleagues let symmetric subjects 
simultaneously choose an integer. The higher the integer the higher the cost to the 
individual, and the higher the associated potential payoff. However, everyone’s payoff is 
determined by the lowest integer chosen within the group. Hence, any contribution above 
this “weak link” is wasted. Any symmetric choice pattern is an equilibrium; the most 
efficient is where everyone chooses the highest possible number. Overall, there is mixed 
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support in these games for the claim that a payoff dominant equilibrium is always focal  
(see, e.g., Van Huyck, Battalio & Beil, 1990, 1991; See also Ochs, 1995 for an overview; 
See Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe & Ross,1990, Brandts & Cooper, 2006;  Weber, Camerer & 
Knez, 2004; Keser, Ehrhart & Berninghaus,1998 for replications).   
A WL game differs from the MM in the strategic uncertainty associated with high 
contributions: In the former, choosing a high number is risky for everyone. A deviation 
downward by even a single “weak link” negatively affects everyone else’s payoff. In the 
MM the payoff from a high group contribution is less uncertain since the game extends 
across groups but final payoffs are computed based on contributions within groups. 
Therefore, one or even several players’ deviation often have little impact on a contributor’s 
expected earnings and often have a positive, rather than a negative, effect (See Section 
II.C). 17
Pareto-ranked asymmetric equilibria in a step-level VCM. In step-level VCMs 
(henceforth, SL-VCM) (Isaac, Schmitz & Walker, 1984) the group account only yields a 
payoff if joint contributions reach a specified level. Any configuration with aggregate 
contributions at that level is an equilibrium.  Even though both are variations of the 
standard VCM, there are significant structural differences between a SL-VCM and the 
MM. Most notably again, the efficient equilibrium in the SL-VCM is much less stable than 
in the MM. Similar to WL games, in the SL-VCM a slight deviation by one contributor so 
that the required threshold is not reached drives everyone’s incentives toward the 
equilibrium of non-contribution by all. 18 In fact, in the majority of instances, the SL-VCM 
                                                 
17 Competition between groups with regard to the integer level chosen (Bornstein Gneezy & Nagel, 2002; 
Riechmann & Weimann (2004), or exclusion of the “weakest link” which effectively reduces risk (Fatas, 
Neugebauer & Perote, 2006) help facilitate coordination on a Pareto superior outcome. 
18 Another difference is that in an asymmetric equilibrium in the SL-VCM, the payoffs from its different 
strategies can vary greatly.  In the MM by contrast, all expected, even though not necessarily final, payoffs 
are very similar across all strategies that are part of an asymmetric equilibrium. In that sense the MM 
resembles ME games where, in equilibrium, payoffs for different strategies are equal or close to equal. 
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is not very effective at maintaining high contributions.19 The MM in contrast, as the 
experimental test described below shows, is very effective at raising efficiency.  
 
IV. METHOD 
Design and participants  
The MM was examined under MPCR=0.5 and MPCR = 0.3 (see Table 1). Both 
MPCRs are commonly used in linear VCM experiments.  Under each MPCR condition, 
there were four experimental sessions with twelve participants each, a total of 96 subjects. 
Subjects were undergraduates from George Mason University were recruited from the 
general student population for an experiment with payoffs contingent upon the decisions 
they and other participants made during the session. Each session lasted for about two 
hours.  
Procedure 
Each participant received a $7 show-up fee, and was privately paid her 
experimental earnings at the end of the experiment. Participants were seated at computer 
terminals, visually separated from others by blinders. At the beginning of each round, each 
subject received one hundred tokens to invest in either a private account, which returned 
one token for every token invested to that subject alone, or a group account, which returned 
tokens at the specified MPCR to everyone in his group including himself. For example, 
when the MPCR was 0.5, each token contributed to the group account returned 0.5 tokens 
to each person in the group. A new period began after all of the subjects indicated that they 
                                                                                                                                                    
Related, in the SL-VCM subjects who apply the same strategy receive the same payoff. This is not the case in 
the MM because of the random solving of ties, which always occurs in equilibrium (Table 1). 
19 Its effectiveness depends somewhat on how high the threshold is. The higher the threshold, the riskier a 
contribution is. If the risk associated with wasted contributions is removed, contributions often rise even 
though there is also evidence to the contrary (see, e.g., Dawes et al., 1986).   
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were ready. 20
Group assignment. In each round the twelve participants decided simultaneously 
how to divide their endowment between the group account and their respective individual 
accounts. After all subjects had made their contribution decisions they were separated in 
three groups of four: The four highest investors to the group account were put into one 
group, the fifth through the eighth highest investors into another group and the four lowest 
investors into a third group, with ties broken at random. After grouping, subjects’ earnings 
were calculated based on the group to which they had been assigned. Note that group 
assignment depended only on the subjects’ current contributions, not on contributions in 
previous rounds. Subjects were regrouped according to these criteria at each of the 80 
decision rounds. Appendix A contains the written instructions.  
End-of-round feedback.  After each round, an information screen showed a 
subject’s own private and public investment in that round, the total investment made by the 
group she belonged to, and her total earnings. The screen also contained an ordered series 
of the group account contributions by all participants, with a subject’s own contribution 
highlighted so that she could see her relative standing. This ordered series was visually 
split into three groups of four, which further underscored that participants had been 
grouped according to their contributions, and that any ties had been broken at random. .  
                                                 
20 The exchange rate between tokens and US Dollars was 1000:1.  In session 05-1 the exchange rate was 
880:1. Data from this session were not different from the data of the other MPCR=0.5 sessions. This session 
was therefore included in the data set and in the aggregate analyses.  
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V. RESULTS 
Result 1 
The MM substantially and reliably increases efficiency compared to a standard VCM.  
The solid lines in Figure 1 display mean contributions per MPCR and per round. 
Contributions are high and stable over all 80 rounds. Compare this to the regular VCM’s 
mean contributions, which start at about half of the endowment and decline toward the 
vicinity of zero within about ten rounds (Ledyard, 1995; Davis & Holt, 1993).  
Result 2  
Observed mean contributions correspond to mean contributions in the Pareto 
dominant equilibrium.  
The broken lines in Figure 1 represent the predicted mean contributions in the 
Pareto dominant equilibrium. Observed mean contributions per MPCR (solid lines) closely 
and steadily trace the predicted values.  Mean contributions over all 80 rounds are 70 
tokens for MPCR=0.3 (75 if the Pareto dominant equilibrium is adhered to without error) 
and 84 tokens under MPCR=0.5 (83.3 in the Pareto dominant equilibrium). 21 This patterns 
also emerges in the single sessions where the means are 65.2, 72.2, 71.8 and 72.3 for 
MPCR=0.3, and 86.1, 83.1, 81.3 and 84.9 for MPCR=0.5. The paths of single session over 
trials (Figure 2) resembles their aggregate pattern shown in Figure 1.  
Result 3 
Strategies that are part of the Pareto dominant equilibrium are predominantly 
selected.   
 The most efficient pure strategy equilibrium in the MM is extremely asymmetric 
since it consists of the two corner strategies from among a set of 101 strategies. Figure 3 
                                                 
21 Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon tests (See, e.g., Siegel & Castellan, 1988) with each session mean as one 
observation reject the null hypotheses that the mean contributions are the same across MPCRs (w=10, p < 
0.014) 
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displays the percentage in which available choices occurred over all trials, per MPCR.  In 
both MPCR conditions, subjects concentrated on the two strategies that are part of the 
payoff dominant equilibrium. Choices closely neighboring them are also somewhat more 
frequent. In light of the pattern displayed in Figure 3, in the analysis that follows choices 
≥98 are classified as full contributions, and choices ≤ 2 as noncontribution. 22 With this 
classification, 86 % of choices under MPCR 0.5, and 66% of choices under MPCR=0.3 fall 
under one of the two equilibrium strategies. 23 Result 5 below addresses this MPCR-related 
difference in percentages. There is no indication of attempts at any of the other less 
efficient equilibria involving low positive contributions (See Table 1, column 3).  
Result 4 
The proportions in which equilibrium strategies were selected are very close to  those 
of the payoff dominant equilibrium.  
In the payoff dominant equilibrium 10/12 of subjects (83.3%) make a full 
contribution under MPCR=0.5, and 9/12 under MPCR=0.3, while the remainder 
contributes nothing (See Table 1, columns 2, 3 and 8, shaded cells). Figure 4 displays, by 
MPCR and per round, the observed percentage of zero contributions and full contributions, 
and their respective proportions in the Pareto dominant equilibrium. Within a few trials 
subjects reach close-to-equilibrium proportions. Figure 5 confirms this aggregate pattern 
for every single session even though the pattern is slightly less pronounced under MPCR-
0.3, particularly in session 3-1.24   
                                                 
22 This is in accordance with both the prominence hypothesis (Selten, 1997) that people tend to make their 
choices in multiples of five, and the argument about neighboring strategies by Erev and Roth (1998). As can 
be inferred from Figure 3, this classification only minimally changes the analysis since choices closely 
neighboring the exact equilibrium strategies are relatively few.  
23 The respective exact counts are 83% and 56%. 
24 One-sample Kolmgorov-Smirnov tests (See, e.g., Siegel and Castellan, 1988) of the null hypothesis that the 
data come from a distribution exactly as specified in the most efficient equilibrium failed to rejected the null 
hypothesis at p=0.001 for sessions 05-1 and 05-2. Note that these are very stringent tests since behavior under 
a choice among 101 strategies is tested against a null hypothesis distribution that only allows for two 
strategies in specific proportions. 
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Result 5 
There are indications of behavioral MPCR effects.   
Figures 1- 5 show that aggregate contributions vary by MPCR as theoretically 
expected if  the most efficient equilibrium is realized in both MPCR conditions.  While 
behavior under both MPCR conditions is close to the respective Pareto dominant 
equilibrium, it appears somewhat closer under MPCR=0.5 than under MPCR=0.3. Under 
MPCR=0.5 the absolute frequencies of zero and full contributions over all 80 rounds are 
respectively 7 and 8 absolute percentage points lower than expected,  but for MPCR=0.3 
this difference is 9% and 26% (see also Figures 4 and 5). A one-tailed nonparametric 
Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test (See, e.g., Siegel and Castellan, 1988) with each session as 
an observation borderline rejects (p ≤ 0.056) the null hypothesis that the frequency of 
intermediate strategies, (that is, strategies that are not part of the equilibrium configuration) 
under MPCR=0.5 is equal to or larger than the frequency under MPCR=0.3, in favor of the 
alternate hypothesis (tentatively developed in Section II.B) that intermediate strategies are 
more frequent under MPCR=0.3. However, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 25 fails to reject 
the null hypothesis that the shape of distributions of intermediate strategies differ by 
MPCR. Hence, their lower MPCR did not lead MPCR=0.3 subjects to systematically 
attempt any of the equilibria with lower positive contributions (Listed in Table 1, column 
3).26 Figure 3 confirms that if subjects meant to somehow hedge their bets under 
MPCR=0.3, their hedging strategies covered the entire strategy space.      
                                                 
25 For this test choices were bundled into multiples of five, based on the pattern displayed in Figure 3. For 
example, choices of 3, 4, 6 and 7 were recoded as “5”.  
26 In fact the mean of the intermediate contributions is higher under MPCR= 0.3 (59/100) than under 
MPCR=0.5 (48/100) but this difference is not significant (Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test with the mean of 
intermediate strategies per session as one unit of observation, W=13, p ≤ 0.20). 
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Result 6  
Individual strategies are unsystematic.  
Individual choices over trials can be viewed at http://www.agsm.edu.au/~bobm/data.  As 
mentioned in Section II.A, for each row in Table 1 there are actually  asymmetric 
equilibria, with various players taking one of two roles, either contributing or not 
contributing. As Ochs (1999, p.143) states, once a profile of mutual best responses is 
realized, there is reason to expect that this stable pattern is repeated. While the payoff 
dominant equilibrium organizes aggregate behavior per round, individual choice paths over 
trials are diverse and hard to account for. Some subjects stick with one (mostly 
equilibrium) strategy, others alternate between the two equilibrium strategies or between 
equilibrium strategies and intermediate choices, in varying proportions. There is no 
evidence that individual strategies stabilize with experience. In this regard, the data 
resemble the well-documented pattern in ME games where aggregate behavior is also well 
captured by the equilibrium while individual strategies are hard to account for. 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
b
N
27
There is however one noteworthy regularity: In the standard VCM and some of its 
modifications in which subjects are sorted based on contributions but unbeknownst to 
them, stable contributor types have been identified. For example, some contribute as long 
as others do likewise, while so-called free-riders quite consistently contribute nothing (See, 
e.g., Gunnthorsdottir, Houser & McCabe, 2007; Ones & Putterman, 2006; Fischbacher, 
Gächter & Fehr, 2001; Keser & Van Winden, 2000; Kurzban & Houser, 2001; 2005). In 
the MM however, even though its asymmetric equilibria require behavioral heterogeneity 
including free-riding by a proportion of participants, there are hardly any stable free-riders.  
                                                 
27 31% of subjects in MPCR=0.5 made a full contribution in ≥ 70 of the 80 trials. In MPCR=0.3, 21% 
subjects did.  
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If those who contributed ≤ 2 in ≥ 50% of all trials are classified as non-contributors, there 
were only 6/96 such subjects, all in MPCR=0.3. 28   
 
VI. DISCUSSION 
We have shown that a Meritocracy that stratifies participants according to their 
contribution to the group good is an effective mechanism to overcome the free-rider 
problem. A simple adjustment to the excludability of the group good, making strata 
membership individually controllable rather than arbitrary, changes the equilibrium 
structure of a standard VCM and vastly improves efficiency. In society people do in fact 
contribute to joint output, broadly defined, and we have reviewed some contemporary and 
historical examples that can be accounted for by our model.  Since the nature of the team 
output covered by the model is broad, and equilibrium requirement for a close-to Pareto 
optimal solution not very strict (see Theorem Section II.A.) Meritocracy Mechanism is 
applicable to a wide variety of settings.   
In our theoretical analysis we have extended a standard group-level analysis typical 
for the VCM into an analysis of a broadly defined social network in which members 
compete for inclusion in its various strata that vary in desirability.  We believe that we 
have, at the same time, given some indications to what could explain prior empirical results 
that show impressive efficiency gains in otherwise standard VCMs if group membership 
becomes competitively based on contributions.  
The experimental findings in the present study underscore the predictive and 
descriptive power of even quite complex Nash equilibria on the aggregate level, a 
phenomenon Kahneman (1988, p.12) termed “magical”. The Meritocracy Mechanism is 
particularly demanding on participants with regard to tacit coordination. There is a rich 
                                                 
28 They contributed ≤ 2 in 75, 65, 54, 43, 43 and 40 trials, respectively.   
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strategy set and multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria, which are complex and counterintuitive. 
Somewhat surprisingly maybe, this is not a problem with regard to subject behavior. It is 
unlikely that participants in a Meritocracy Mechanism are able to grasp, or even roughly 
guess, its complex equilibria. Yet the most efficient equilibrium was reliably coordinated.29
Our results underscore the merits of meritocracies above and beyond the obvious:  In 
addition to its other well-recognized benefits, a meritocracy increases a social unit’s 
efficiency because it substantially reduces free-riding. There is less of an incentive to 
contribute if social stratification is by arbitrary privilege. If, however, an individual’s 
contribution, a variable that is under individual control determines her group membership, 
there is an obvious incentive to do one’s best. The empirical confirmation that the most 
efficient equilibrium is easily coordinated in an MM setting indicates that humans respond 
with ease to this kind of incentive structure, a fact also borne out by observing the diverse 
field settings in which the Mechanism has been implemented.  
Criticisms and extensions   
This paper has focused on the effectiveness of a new mechanism at the aggregate level. 
The workings of he MM on the individual level need to be examined in depth, such as 
individual decision strategies30 and, possibly, an MPCR-related impact of loss aversion.  
On the aggregate level, we recognize that while strata size is often fixed it isn’t always. 
Hence an extension where group size is endogenous and players are grouped based on 
whether their contributions are above or below certain thresholds would be appropriate.  
Yet another important question is the potential effect of unequal endowments on the 
MM system.  In the basic model introduced here this issue is bypassed since all participants 
                                                 
29 Other somewhat structurally related games described in Section III are much simpler from a subject’s 
viewpoint; their strategy space is often more restricted (WL games and in particular, ME games with binary 
strategy space), and their pure strategy equilibria are much more intuitive (ME, WL, and SL-VCM games all 
fall into the latter category).   
30 Analysis of individual strategies should into account the fact that ties are broken at random, which means 
that payoffs for the same strategy can vary between trials.  
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have equal endowments. The next step is to examine how sensitive the model is to 
inequities. Most communities provide some insurance and aid that raises the payoff of 
those less able to contribute, e.g., charities or unemployment benefits. Such equalizing 
practices could also be included into an MM model with unequal endowments, their extent 
varied, and the effects examined.   
Finally, we recognize that a pure meritocracy in its simplest form may not always 
be optimal for a social unit, and not only because large payoff differentials could reduce 
social cohesion but also because individual contributions can be multidimensional. For 
example, in organizational hiring, in addition to direct output, there is the question of 
employees’ cultural fit, and in some cases involving universities or nations, there is long-
term strategic value in diversity. However, such factors could also be included in a model 
of a member’s current and prospective contributions.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Instructions 
 
This is an experiment in the economics of group decision-making.  You have already 
earned $7.00 for showing up at the appointed time. If you follow the instructions closely 
and make decisions carefully, you will make a substantial amount of money in addition to 
your show-up fee.  
 
There will be many decision-making periods. In each period, you are given an endowment 
of 100 tokens.  You need to decide how to divide these tokens between two accounts: a 
private account and a group account.  
 
Each token you place in the private account generates a cash return to you (and to you 
alone) of 1 cent.  
 
Tokens that group members invest in the group account will be added together to form the 
group investment. The group investment generates a cash return of 2 cents per token. These 
earnings are then divided equally between group members. Your group has 4 members 
(including yourself).  
 
Returns from the group investment are illustrated in the table below.  The left column lists 
various amounts of group investment; the right column contains the corresponding personal 
earnings for each group member.  
 
Returns from the Group Investment 
 
Total investment by Return to each group 
your group member  
 (From group investment) 
 
    0     0 
   20   10 
  40   20 
  60   30 
100   50 
150   75 
200 100 
300 150 
 400 200 
 
 
 
Example: 
Assume that, in a specific period, your endowment is 100 tokens. Assume further that you 
decide to contribute 50 tokens to your private account and 50 tokens to the group account. 
The other group members together contribute an additional 250 tokens to their group 
accounts. That makes the group investment 300 tokens, which generates 600 cents (300 * 2 
= 600). The 600 cents are then split equally among the 4 group members. Therefore, each 
group members earns 150 cents from the group investment (600/4=150). In addition to 
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earnings from the group account, each member gets 1 cent for every token invested in 
his/her private account. As you invested 50 tokens in the private account, your total profit 
in this period is 150 + 50 = 200 cents.  
 
Each period proceeds as follows: 
First, decide on the number of tokens to place in the private and in the group account, 
respectively.  Use the mouse to move your cursor to the box labeled “Private Account”. To 
make your private investment, click on the box and enter the number of tokens you wish to 
allocate to this account.  Do likewise for the box labeled “Group Account” Entries in the 
two boxes must sum to your endowment. To submit your investment click on the “Submit” 
button.  You will then wait until everyone else has submitted his or her investment 
decision. 
 
Second, once everyone has submitted his or her investment decision, you will be assigned 
to a group with 4 members (including yourself).  This assignment will proceed in the 
following manner: participants' contributions to the group account will first be ordered 
from the highest to the lowest. Then the four highest contributors will be grouped together. 
Participants whose contributions ranked from 5-8 will form another group. Finally, the four 
lowest contributors will form the third group. Any ties that may occur will be broken at 
random. Experimental earnings will be computed after you have been assigned to your 
group. Thus, your contribution to the group account in a specific round affects which group 
you are assigned to in that round. 
 
Third, you will receive a message with your experimental earnings for the period. This 
information will also appear in your Record Sheet at the bottom of the screen. The record 
sheet will also show the group account contributions by all participants in the experiment, 
including yours, in ascending order. Your contribution will be highlighted.  
 
A new period will begin after everyone has acknowledged his or her earnings message. 
 
After the last period, you will receive a message with your total experimental earnings 
(sum of earnings in each period). 
 
This is the end of the instructions. 
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Table 1 
Structure of equilibria with nonzero contributions for N=12, n=4, wi = 100, and 
MPCR=0.3 or MPCR=0.5.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
MPCR 
 
b1
 
si* 2
Possible 
contributor 
payoffs 
Expected 
contributor 
payoff 
Possible  
non-
contributor 
payoffs 
Expected 
non-
contributor 
payoff 
Efficiency 
(percent) 
   Low High  Low High   
1 99.3 100.2 100.02 100 100.3 100.1 0.4 
2 98.6 100.4 100.04 100 100.6 100.3 0.8 
5 
3 97.9 100.6 100.06 100 100.9 100.4 1.3 
1 99.3 100.2 100.1 n/a 100.3 0.7 
2 98.6 100.4 100.2 n/a 100.6 1.5 
3 97.9 100.6 100.3 n/a 100.9 2.3 
4 97.2 100.8 100.4 n/a 101.2 3.0 
5 96.5 101.0 100.5 n/a 101.5 3.8 
6 95.8 101.2 100.6 n/a 101.8 4.5 
7 95.1 101.4 100.7 n/a 102.1 5.3 
0.3 
9 
100 30.0 120.0 110.0 n/a 130.0 75.0 
1 100.0 101.0 100.8 n/a 101.0 0.7 
2 100.0 102.0 101.6 n/a 102.0 1.5 
0.5 10 
100 100.0 200.0 180.8 n/a 200.0 83.3 
    
1 The number of players out of twelve who make a nonzero contribution. The remaining 12-b    
players contribute zero.  
2 The amount of the nonzero equilibrium contribution (out of 100 tokens possible).  
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE:   
The pure strategy equilibrium of non-contribution by all (See Section II.A, Observation 2) , 
which exists in all MPCR conditions, has been omitted from this table.  
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 Figure 1 
Observed mean group investment per round, compared to mean group investment 
in the Pareto dominant equilibrium, per MPCR.  
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Figure 2A 
   Equilibrium and mean contributions per round, per session, MPCR=0.3  
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Equilibrium and mean contributions per round, per session, MPCR=0.5 
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Relative frequency at which each strategy was chosen, by MPCR  
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Figure 4 
Observed proportion of zero and full contributions per round and proportions in 
the Pareto dominant equilibrium, by MPCR 
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Figure 5 A  
 Raw frequencies per session MPCR=0.3 
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Raw frequencies per session. MPCR=0.5 
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